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This text is a draft of the third chapter of an upcoming book on explana-
tory, interpretative and understanding approaches to social studies in gen-
eral and case studies in particular.
The first chapter, ”Coming to Terms - on language, induction, deduction
and our uncertain grasp of realities,” is available as Working Paper 2004-
8 from Aarhus School of Business (contact the author or the department,
liw@asb.dk).
The second chapter, ”Truth – a concept of imagination with many faces,”
is available as Working Paper 2004-2.
The remaining chapters will deal with the practical challenges of empiri-
cally-based social research in general and of case studies in particular,
whether conducted in an explanatory, interpretative or understanding
mode!
Please, dear reader, excuse the empty footnotes: they are part of my own
account for internal references for the project as a whole.
Comments and observations regarding the present text are most welcome.
They will be appreciated – be they nasty and/or conducive to greater en-
lightenment.
The 2nd version of the present working paper is the same as the former
(WP 2004-9) except for some minor editing and a rewrite of the last
chapter, “Explanation, interpretation, understanding …”
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In this chapter we will
•  explore the status of social studies in general and case studies in par-
ticular in regard to generalization and reliability;
•  acknowledge how we discern the external as well as our internal
worlds depend on our theoretical predispositions, particular interests
and individual sensitivities:
•  A dependency that nevertheless may be loosened as we become more
aware of it.
We should continuously try to be aware how the words we have at our
disposal
a)  influence our perceptions
b) are contingent prerequisites for informing others about
o  what we feel as well as about
o  what our mind is set to
c)  yet words are not the only means for trying to express what we seek to
express – others being drawing of pictures, mimicking, dancing, etc.
Thus – in the eyes of the other or in our own hindsight, the words we use
d) may function as biases that direct and even mis-direct our thinking, in-
cluding our narratives as well as our grasp of our perceptions, attitudes
and feelings1.
Words are not just words. They are embedded in structures of meaning.
They direct us towards what is perceived as the knowable and conse-
quently may lead us away from what we otherwise might have become
sensitive to.
e) Luckily also listening and being near to others may help us become
more aware of our lack of sensitivity, inadequacies of discerning and in-
ability to express what is going on so to speak behind our backs. One of
the most potential challenging and rewarding beauties of social research
in general and field research in particular!
                                            
1 Bias is associated with our personality, a split of part of our psyche which has grown
to become a favoured view for all sorts of reasons, rational as well as emotional and
primarily in a negative (judgemental) sense.2
Overview
What empirical knowledge consists in or/and how it should be produced
has been controversial since the dawn of philosophy, and has certainly left
an imprint on case studies, too. Logical positivists like Carnap2 emphasized
the need for a continuous accumulation of empirical data in order to build
coherent universal pictures, the bottom-up approach. This makes sense as
far as the behavior of anything in a given environment only can be ex-
plained if the carrying elements and the relations between them are known.
In contrast, critical rationalists like Popper3 claim that the essential issue
is not how theories are created; what matters is whether and how they
could be justified. First of all, they have to be formulated in a way that
makes them testable. So such a top-down approach makes sense, in as
much as we have already shown that formulation of laws is not just a mat-
ter of facts, but a decision, too, about what might be the case.4
These two stands are reflected in the two most prominent, explicit
case-research approaches in organizational theory: the first one, the bot-
tom-up approach of progressive integration of composite theses grounded
in elementary data, the second being the top-down test approach. Both are
linear:
•  Theory Building, grounded in an inductive accumulation of data with
no bias towards or favor of any already chosen theory, most explicitly
presented by the Grounded Theory5 as the Glaser-Strauss Approach.
•  Theory Testing, derived from Experimental Research and rigorously
represented by the Popper-Yin Approach, using cases as the mean to
confirm or better even, to reject any pre-chosen theories.
Theory Testing is strictly linear both in principle and practice, whereas
grounded designs may only be linear in principle as a logic-looking way
                                            
2 Rudolf Carnap: Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Berlin, 1928.
3 Karl Popper: The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935), London, 1959.
4 Refer back to figure on induction, contained in the previous chapter: Coming to terms,
Working Paper 2004-8, Aarhus 2004
5 Grounded Method (or Theory) comes in many versions. Here I stick to the original
version in order to honor it for its passion and emotional drive: Barney G Glaser &
Anselm L Strauss: The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Aldine, Chicago, 19673
of presentation. Yet, what any linear design may win in conceptual clarity,
it may loose in practicality:
Strictly aiming at confirmation or rejection of a given theory will pre-
vent us from benefiting from what we learn in the course of fieldwork as
well as what may unfold during any later phase of analysis.
On the other hand, we may see something already at the outset if we
have not made ourselves dependent on a particular set of theories. Yet it
would hardly help us, if we believe ourselves to be free of biases. Instead
listening to others and learning to respect their experiences and concerns
could help us better to realize how unaware we may be about some of our
initial concepts, how inadequate they may be and they how require ad-
justment.
As a result we here add a third, explicitly cyclic principle of design:
•  Explorative Integration, a cyclic approach of a continuous dialogue
between pre-chosen theories, generated data, our interpretation, feed-
back from our informants, which hopefully will lead us to a more in-
clusive theory building or even understanding.
The prevalent mode for Theory Testing is primarily explanatory, and so
was Grounded Theory conceived to be. But case studies can easily be
placed within a broader context than merely a search for explanatory evi-
dence. As such Grounded Method and Explorative Integration may reach
out towards interpretation or be conducted in an understanding mode, as
we shall see.
Whatever the differences between the three approaches, they do share
some features. Firstly, in contrast to experiments case studies are embedded
in real-life situations. Thus the case researcher cannot control the environ-
ment: neither the flow of information among the subjects nor the interac-
tion between them and external sources.
Instead the sensitive researcher is constantly called to be aware of the
environment. Single as well as group interviews with people which share
experiences illustrates the importance of the personal past for interpreta-
tions of the present. And as we deal with people as they deal with ongoing
business we must have a sense of the competition, market trends, potential
alternative technologies and administrative practices. Thus, external cir-
cumstance – past and present – have to be an integrated part of the case
study itself. This accentuates the need to qualify and, if possible, to quan-
tify the range and depth of opus operandi in far greater detail than research-4
ers working within the tradition of the classical, social experiments and
surveys seem to find necessary.
Thirdly, the compelling need to specify the circumstances under which
any case study is conducted is imperative for another reason, as well:
If generalization from a limited set of case studies is to be possible, it
requires information on the situation around cases chosen in order for us to
a)  compare them as well as to
b) evaluate when and which of the results we may transfer from the
cases studied to ensuing cases we imagine could be in a somewhat
similar situation.
So let us first take a look at how we – often regardless of opus operandi –
make inferences in everyday situations:
Do not just look for facts,
but be aware when, where and how you generate them
Let’s say, at a dinner I observe a lady who hardly eats anything. To be told
"she is not hungry" would obviously be a too simplistic "after fact expla-
nation", adding nothing to any grounded understanding of her behavior. To
be told that she has already eaten, would make me understand her situation
a little better, as we all know how hard it is to eat when you are already
full. Yet, if this is just an inference, it may be misleading. She may be
fasting and may not have eaten for days. Thus, even small-scale theory
should not be applied to account for events without the greatest possible
awareness of circumstantial evidence.
 Furthermore what once was the case may not be so today. However
true yesterday’s views were, they might be today's delusion. In a time long
gone, versatility was essential for the execution of a craft. With the transi-
tion to industrial production, efficiency in terms of simplified work rou-
tines became a well-tested outcome of continued work specialization. With
the change of technology towards automation and more customized pro-
duction, effectiveness rather than efficiency is now crucial. As before the
Industrial Revolution, versatility of the workforce is once more seen as
crucial to productivity. Thus historical evidence is needed to judge the
soundness of otherwise well-proven, normative guidelines for success.
So, fieldwork is not just an adventure of “being in the field”, but a
search for whether the circumstances under which prevailing theories were
developed, still stick. As a result the stage is set for seeing events as con-5
tingent on geographical, societal – including prevailing types of ownership
and the labor market structure, cultural as well as technological – circum-
stances including the personal backgrounds of the individuals we approach.
Defining case studies as a research strategy
With a sidelong glance at the classical experiment, we, along with Yin, de-
fine a case study as an "empirical inquiry that investigates a real-life
phenomenon within its real-life context", with the implication that the
environment, as blurred as the boundaries may be, is an integrated part of
the inquiry. 6
Case research, as well as surveys and experiments, each have their in-
herent potentials as well as weaknesses. Surveys may identify "who or
what made X happen, how many times and to which degree". Experiments
and case studies as they unfold may help the researcher identify "why and
how X happened". Thus, both experiments and case studies offer us a way
to trace links between discrete happenings, whereas surveys just measure
outcomes.
But while experiments are conducted in the artificial setting of a labora-
tory in order to maintain control of the environment around subjects, case
studies are made as subjects interact both with each other and within their
setting. So case research may help the researcher explore when and under
which circumstances, how and why a certain chain of events may be re-
leased.
As case studies are embedded in real-life situations, researchers – like
the agents themselves – may not always be alert enough to sense or foresee
all that is happening, nor what could or actually – in hindsight – did turn
out to be a critical event. In order to ensure both completeness and to en-
hance our ability to backtrack evidence, case studies should draw on multi-
ple sources of evidence, interviews, observational and archival studies, etc.
Apart from being an analytical necessity, such a multiple source strat-
egy has one further advantage: It provides us with the means to distinguish
                                            
6 Robert K. Yin: Case Study Research − design and methods (1984), Sage, California,
1989, page 23.6
between private and shared perceptions of what was and is going on within
the organization as well as the evidence of what it means to those involved.
Looking at cases
Since World War II, the need to explore whether the growing number of
public programs has the intended effects, has given rise to evaluation re-
search. Case studies have emerged as an eminent tool for exploring what
made a program succeed or fail
Case studies may also explore one site in depth in order to enrich our
feel for contemporary “lifestyles”, as was the case with the single case
study "Street Corner Society" by William F. Whyte10– a ground-breaking
description  of  spontaneously  organized  youth  gangs.  Although  the
phenomenon was well known, the internal structure of such groups and
their external relations to others remained as unknown to the public at large
as if they were tribes on an island in the Pacific. Thus the work helped elu-
cidate a contemporary phenomenon to the general public.
Or a case study may compare a select important issue across several
cases. Books teaching students strategic planning is as plentiful as the num-
ber of MBA training courses. Yet, empirical studies of how companies ac-
tually conceptualize, evolve and experiment with the implementation of
new organizational policies and business strategies are far scarcer. Actual
case studies do in fact challenge the streamlined, rationalistic schemes of
such textbooks.11 National culture, union structure and organizational self-
perception are as crucial parameters for organizational performance as any
apparently rational data analysis of selected internal and external sources;
as e.g. shown in Robert H. Miles' study of the American tobacco industry,12
or in Duncan Gallie's comparative study of oil companies located in two
different countries, Great Britain and France,13 or in Jeff Ellis' studies of
                                            
10  William F. Whyte: Street Corner Society, the Social Structure of Italian Slum
(1943), University of Chicago Press, 1955.
12  Robert H. Miles: Coffin Nails and Corporate Strategies, Prentice Hall, New Jersey,
1982.
13  Duncan Gallie: In Search of the New Working Class − Automation and Social
Integration within the Capitalist Enterprise, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1978.7
different oil companies in the same country, the U.S.14 When exposed to
external challenges, firms – even in the same line of business – react in a
variety of ways, as do individuals. To understand how, when and why calls
for in-depth studies – case studies that is.
A meta-theoretical approach – the case of Allison
Case studies may also be meta-theoretical and test the explanatory power
and dimensional range of various scientific paradigms vis-à-vis real-life
events, as Graham Allison did in his extraordinary study of the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis.15 He was able to demonstrate
•  which phenomena each approach or scheme of thought is able to un-
ravel, as well as
•  the different types of data requirements needed and
•  how extensive the data requirements are for each scientific point of
view.
Allison’s three main approaches may, in short, be characterized as:
  I.  A  rash  effort  to  make  what  happens  –  seen  at  a  distance  –
intelligible. – The approach of political commentators in public
media.
  II.  A scrupulous effort to explore how various agencies handle infor-
mation and what they knew at different points in time. Thus, Allison
discovered that American Intelligence was informed about the con-
struction of missile bases in Cuba in due time, but also that the in-
formation went missing amongst tens of thousands of other bits of
information.
  III.  An endeavor to uncover what went on among the key actors in the
White House. Who said what to whom when, in short what initia-
tives were taken and when, how and why did the President and the
men around him respond like they supposedly did? For further
illustration refer to Figure TT.
                                            
14  R.  Jeffrey  Ellis:  Managing  Strategy  in  the  Real  World,  Lexington  Books,
Massachusetts, 1988.
15  Graham Allison: The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
(1971), Little, Brown and Company, US.8
Figure  TT:ALLISON’S  THREE  APPROACHES  TO  THE  CUBAN
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With certain reservations the three approaches may be said to build on dif-
ferent epistemologies.
•  The arguments of Model I obviously build on interpretation, although
they present themselves in an explanatory form.
•  The descriptions in Model II are couched in the explanatory mode.
•  While Model III presents a narrative in an understanding mode in so far
as it seemingly builds on the self-interpretative reports from the actors
involved. Yet we have to remind ourselves that such reports may have
been produced with the purpose of self-promotion.
Cases in consequence
The cases quoted illustrate how case study and fieldwork may add realism
to social research, to confront, enrich our hitherto too superficially ac-
knowledged dimensions of organizational life and human existence in
general.
  Allison’s approach, however, demonstrates an additional point: The
point of view taken determines which data you aim to generate. So, if you
confine yourself to a fixed set of theories, methodology in general may still
be a problem – but at least not one of choice. Your perspective chosen de-
termines what is worth looking for.
Thus it illustrates how much more theoretically attentive we as case stu-
dents have to be, if we aim not only to describe, but also to listen to and
catch what is on people’s minds and perhaps even assist them as they
struggle to change their world. We have to enrich our theoretical sensitivity
and simultaneously try to embrace several perspectives and thus data
sources. And certainly both exploration and integration are major chal-
lenges.
Case studies are essential for the natural sciences as well
Whilst some schools of thought within the social sciences conceptually
feed  on  themselves,  the  central  role  case  studies  have  within  natural
sciences is remarkable. Clarification of the wear and tear on metals ex-
posed to everyday usage is crucial for the engineering sciences. It is not
enough to know how metals react in the lab. The breakthrough of the
natural sciences – as we know them today in contrast to for instance
speculative alchemy – is intimately linked to real, natural life studies.10
“Cases” can thus be seen as a means to establish a form of correspon-
dence between an alleged behavior expressed as text and a world of reali-
ties, be it the performance of an open-air aluminum coastal construction in
Alaska or the emotional strain of unsatisfied workers in a small-town, mid-
western metal shop, owned by a certain conglomerate in New York in the
late eighties.
FURTHER CHALLENGES TO
CASE STUDIES AS A RESEARCH TOOL
As opposed to the natural sciences, case studies as a social research ap-
proach have been subject to at least two all-too-often repeated criticisms:
•  The object of science is to reach generalized statements. Thus, despite
the depth and scope of a case study, a single or even a few cross-com-
parative case studies are not sufficient to state anything at large about
any subject studied.
•  Field research is so dependent on the researcher herself both as an ob-
servant agent and as the subsequent data analyst that case studies must
be particularly prone to be impregnated by the researcher's personal bias
– whereas quantitative analysis is not.
These points have their foundations. Logically, it may appear inappropriate
to generalize from single cases; just as surveyors cannot, and in the case of
political opinion polls certainly do not, claim to state anything beyond the
sample studied.
Nevertheless, case studies are the only way to explore links between
events, reactions, including decisions, emotions, reflections and behaviors
as they emerge in real-life situations, allowing us to conclude that they are
indeed needed.
However, bias is certainly an inherent threat to case research. For in-
stance conflict sociology showed us how the temptation to see what one
wants to see may get the upper hand. And sure, who is not drawn more to a
certain set of theories rather than others, be it for professional or private
reasons?
However, as case studies thrive on information supplied by informants,
they may be designed to make biases explicit as well as lay theoretical in-
sufficiencies bare – better than any other research scheme set up entirely on
the researcher's conditions, such as surveys and experiments. At least this is
one of the major aims of explorative-integration!11
But let us first take a closer look at the two issues, generalization and
bias:
THE QUEST FOR GENERALIZED STATEMENTS
We have heard it often enough: One cannot generalize within the social
domain. If you claim I am brainless, I may confirm it by denying it vehe-
mently, or I may disconfirm it smilingly with gleaming eyes of apprecia-
tion of what you may say next. So each our own small-scale worlds may
change if and as we react on generalizations made by others.
And we do rely on generalizations made by others. We may believe
ourselves able to go through life without any rules of thumb, proverbs or
any hearsay ideas about what to believe. Yet most of us do not. As such
generalizations are known to occur within social research in at least six dif-
ferent positions:
•  Denial of the very idea that generalizations are possible, as stated by
historians.
•  Generalization by induction based on first-hand generated data, self-
made observations of realities that are expected never to change – pri-
marily the realm of the natural sciences.
•  Generalization from statistical analysis based on sampling, either
o  co-variance between accumulated sets, as exemplified by thousands of
surveys – a principally bottom-up inspired approach; or
o  statistical modeling on the basis of theoretical pre-conceived models, an
explicit, top-down-inspired approach
•  Generalization by logical argument based on
o  comparing the reactions of groups, one is exposed to an induced influ-
ence, the other one is not – the classical experiment.
o  more or less convoluted arguments, often converted deductions based
on Theory of Sets and/or syllogisms
And on top of it all:
•  Analytical generalization: Extension of interwoven statements of obser-
vations/facts, theories and interpretations to a greater domain than the
one observed. A combinatory, integrated approach building on Theory
Test, Grounded Theory as well as tentative imagination, as we shall see.
And beyond that12
•  Dialectical reasoning, an issue outside what concerns us here16.
Opus operandi is integrated in each of these schemata of generalizations in
different ways:
•  Induction based on observations within a supposedly fixed universe has
to be conducted respecting matter and opus operandi, which natural
scientists ensure very conscientiously.
•  Advocates of statistical generalizations based on samples from a greater
population accept the need to pay heed to opus operandi, yet they feel
they can ignore them in principle; the idea being that they hope the
multitude of small-scale variations will neutralize each other as they are
lumped together in the one sweeping analysis. Thus, regard for opus
operandi is generally reduced to an error factor, generally named as ε.
•  Experimental groups: Opus operandi within a chosen set is not only ig-
nored but also assumed to be irrelevant as the people involved are as-
sumed to be of the same kind and like any other person with the same
characteristics  as identified by “us”. The results of social experiments –
often without even stating them – carry the same claim for universality
as an report on what happens to a sphere of 10 grams of pure iron
dropped into a 200-gram 45% solution of nitrogen acid at 20 degrees
Celsius.
•  Deductions: Opus operandi must be stated and seen as important as are
the rules for operationalization of key terms.
•  Analytical generalization: Opus operandi have to be stated as precisely
as possible.
Let us take turns with these:
Unique and narrow as a contrast to shared and broad
Historians have all the best reasons to refrain from using the outbreak of
WW I as a base for stating a “Theory for crisis build-up” that, given well-
specified opus operandi, eventually will lend itself to the forecast of a war.
WW I is the result of a unique situation in which the battle for colonies, the
French-German  War  a  generation  before,  the  fight  for  national
                                            
16 Dialectical reasoning is too vast and complicated an issue to be pursued here. I hope
one day to unravel the conceptual mess this concept is entangled in.13
independence of Balkan States – Croatia in particular – and a lot of other
factors, including the financial interest of the dominant powers of the day
as well as nitty-gritty details like the personalities of the rulers of the day,
all came together in a situation that most likely never will occur again.
True!
Yet historians do rely on generalizations, although on a much smaller
scale. They would simply not be able to give a convincing account of the
flow of events and what tied them together – or might have tied them to-
gether – without resorting to small-scale, generally recognizable accounts.
Thus we have to distinguish between
•    “truths” about social life as it unfolds during the ages – if any exist, as
for instance claimed by Eisenstadt in his study of what has made em-
pires crumble, grow or prosper18 and
•  “rules” of inference, interpretation and make-believe from the present
that we apply in order to make the world intelligible to ourselves and
hopefully to others as well.
By far the majority of historians reject the first. In all modesty they do not
consider themselves able to a) state the necessary conditions for a change
and b) even if they were, the same condition never reoccurs. However,
historians rely on the small-scale, everyday common-sense generalizations
about human behavior in order to make the behavior of their chosen his-
torical figures intelligible to themselves and in turn to us.
Thus, we have to distinguish between generalizations by level. With a
reference to Figure TT we may, as already suggested by Merton19, distin-
guish between
•  Grand scale: sweeping, all-encompassing statements about the social
behaviors and hidden realities lurking beneath the obvious.
•  Mid-level: Statements about the behavior of socially-organized bodies
of a limited size and extension, like firms and distinct social groups of
temporary validity.
                                            
18 S N Eisenstadt: The Political System of Empires, Free Press, New York, 1963
19 Robert K Merton: Social Theory and Social Structure, (1949), Free Press, New York,
2. ed. 1968, Chapter II.14
•  Small scale: Statements like proverbs, easy-to-use psychological rules
of thumb for interpreting the behavior of people we meet or read about.
And while historians with their sense for the concrete, firmly reject the first
possibility, sociologists within the classical tradition make a living out of
creating mid-level generalizations, while some, like Marx, have caused
havoc by seducing others to believe in and act on grand-scale imagery.20
Level of scale and design are, of course, interrelated, as I have tried to
illustrate in Figure LL.
Figure LL: DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GENERALIZATION DURING
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21 As stated in the initial work by Barney G Glaser & Anselm L Strauss: The Discovery
of Grounded Theory, Aldine, Chicago, 1967.15
Generalization by enumeration
based on data generated by first-hand observations of realities
The essence of induction is to dare believe what has up till now been the
case for a limited set of observed coincidences will hold for the future too.
It rests on the idea that language – properly applied – can express reality
and thus be used as the medium for predicting or even planning for the fu-
ture, giving the appropriate opus operandi. We dealt with this in the
previous chapter.22
So let us now turn to statistical generalizations when opus operandi has
not been or even cannot be stated in operative detail:
Generalizations based on sampling and statistical analysis
Despite what Hume said – as already reported23 – sociologists generalize
often without in-depth specification of the preconditions, as demonstrated
in thousands of surveys. This ought to amaze us for several reasons. Here I
will mention two: 1) the lack of concern for opus operandi and 2) the belief
in statistical analysis as if it were the virtue of proper science.
What concerns sociologists is not the history of concrete societies nor
the individual person, but the behavior of groups. Thus, sociologists may –
as Durkheim – be interested in whether modernization of western society
may escalate the suicide rate, and if so, “who” would be most likely to
physically destroy themselves;24 “who” being characterized by sociological
relevant facts such as sex, age, education, occupation, income, etc.
Obviously, in such a scheme “I” as a person am of no interest, nor are
my agonies, doubts and egocentric emotions, shame and other feelings. In
short, opus operandi are ignored but for a few sociologically-defined rele-
vant features, which must be given. It would be impossible to adjust for the
theoretical myriad of conceivable combinations of embedded situations and
personal agonies leading some to suicide and others not. They are simply
countless. But – the argument runs – if you rely on a sufficiently large,
properly composed sample, all these individual variations should outbal-
                                            
22 Reference to Coming to Terms, Working Paper 2004-8, Aarhus 2004.
23 Coming to Terms, op cit
24 We will later – in the chapter on explanation – return to and discuss aspects of Comte
and Durkheim’s foundation of positivism.16
ance each other. The statistical variation around the mean will reveal how
well composed the sample was.
Leaving the probability of spurious relationships aside, this has a dire
consequence: If you simplify opus operandi, you will never be able to pre-
dict what may happen in any concrete case. You may not even be aware of
the circumstances under which an identified relationship might break. Nor
will you know to whom and when the results found may be applicable.
Thus you will be unable to prepare yourself for whom to help and how.
And this situation is not just due to the reasons Hume stated, but to the
methodological approach chosen as well!
This lack of realism is the very reason why scientists –in medicine and
biology – only use statistics as an indicator of potential relations, not as an
argument for cause-effect-relationships. Identification of concrete relations
on a smaller level is the only genuine ideal for the sciences. To science,
statistics is only and indeed often a most useful first step, the next being the
detailed, close-up studies of individual cases. Apparently, the very idea that
the use of statistics in itself may make social research into a science is a
misnomer.
Searching for truth by plane or in the jungle?
Let us look at a case: A total sample of ESOPs in Ohio25 amply illustrates
that employee-owned companies have a far more sound financial growth,
compared to traditionally-owned companies within the same sectors. Now,
is it employee ownership alone that makes all the difference? No! But ap-
parently it may be a condition for growth. Regardless of culture? Probably
not! Furthermore, employee ownership only prospers in conjunction with
employee participation schemes. Thus, employee ownership is not in itself
a sufficient condition for growth, but may be a necessary one, and even
more so in the time to come. So may participation! And even more so may
the conjunction of the two, depending on the level of general education of
the workforce, the stand of the labor union and the types of personalities
involved, etc. The list of opus operandi may seem overwhelming, yet it
adds realism to the issue at stake.
                                            
25 John Logue & Jacquelyne Yates: The Real World of Employee Ownership, Cornell
University Press, 2002.17
Thus we conclude:
Statistical studies are indeed helpful as
•  they can help us achieve a good oversight of the general state of affairs
at certain times and places.
Yet we need case studies in order to
•  obtain insight into why something works, in order to
•  uncover under which conditions (= opus operandi) e.g. identified statis-
tical correlations may still hold.
Apparently, case studies are needed to provide circumstantial evidence for
the range within which aggregated statistical data from selected samples
may be generalized across historical time, degree of technological and so-
cial development, etc.
Generalization by logical argument exclusively based on
comparison of outcome from groups that have been treated differently
Work in a scientific laboratory is done with meticulous control for dis-
turbing side effects of humidity, dust, etc. Likewise, social experiments –
done with experimental and control groups respectively – are conducted in
ways that exclude the participant from any interference with the outer
world and, what all too often is forgotten, undue interference from each
other. Despite such experiments are called social, people who know each
other must be excluded. It could unintentionally disturb performance, if a
participant is able to convey information about his/her own inner reactions
to others who know how to interpret their shrugs, certain glances, smiles,
etc. The researcher wants to be the only one in control. This is ensured by a
random choice selection of participants. Yet in practice, experimenters
generally tend to choose young males for their lab studies.27 Thus the ques-
tion arises: How can we allow ourselves to generalize from experiments
with people unknown to each other to real-life situations. We are hardly
ever called to solve problems with people chosen at random by some power
                                            
26 M Fine & S M Gordon: Feminist Transformations of/despite psychology in M
Crawford & M Gentry (eds): Gender and Thought, Springer, New York 1989, page
146-74.
27 For a critical overview see Shulamit Reinharz: Feminist Methods in Social Research,
Oxford Un Press, 1992, Chapter 5, sidetal?18
figure, nor without knowing what interests they might represent. This was a
fact I personally had not considered before it hit me all the harder on my
very first day studying the emerging patterns of mutual aid at the floor at
Reuther Mold – a company that just the day before had become partially
employee-owned.28 Real-life experiences – be they shared in joy or con-
cealed – shape people and affect their inclination to cooperate.
Generalization by logical argumentation based on design with different
outcomes is sometimes called theoretical generalization29, with induction
being seen as the practical counterpart.
Generalization by convoluted arguments
Apart from the strict logic of experimentation based on comparisons of the
outcome of limited sets, logical reasoning is sometimes used in a myriad of
convoluted ways as neither the premises nor the operational steps are speci-
fied but taken for granted. Let us just look at a sample:
Argument: If Danish economists find it difficult to calculate their in-
come tax, then it must be impossible for most Danes.
This appears as a generalized statement, but is really a deduction based
on a) an assumption: Economists are best qualified to explicate economic
schemes like the complicated Danish tax laws. And b) an alleged fact:
Most Danish economists cannot calculate their own tax.30 And this may
very well be the case. We have even had a Minister of Finance who was
unable to do his own income tax return! How should the rest of us be able
to do it then!
                                            
28 Please refer to Erik Maaløe: The Employee Owner – organizational and individual
change  within  manufacturing  companies  as  participation  and  sharing  grow  and
expand, Academic Press, Copenhagen, 1998. Remaining issues now available from
hvb@asb.dk.29 see Robert K. Yin: Case Study Research − design and methods (1984),
Sage, California, 1989, page 124.
30 The Danish income taxation is indeed complicated. First of all an adjusted income is
shown as a figure on our income returns, next we pay at least nine different types of
income tax, apart from purchase and property taxes.19
Abstract generalization
Although we here limit ourselves to reflecting on generalizations with ex-
plicit empirical grounding, we should mention that alleged generalizations
may indeed be very effective, even though they do not have any precise
reference.
Let me recall Riesman’s 50-year-old idea that people may be either in-
ner or outer directed31, that is, either bound by inner restraint and goal
direction, or open to letting themselves be directed by colleagues, friends
and/or superiors.
Riesman did not ground this dichotomy in any reference to empirical
work of his own. Indeed it just emerges as a very successful condensation
of everyday beliefs with slight reference to research concepts developed by
others. – And so may many of the everyday generalizations we, too, resort
to in everyday conversation.
ANALYTICAL GENERALIZATION
At last we come to “analytical generalization”. A principle by which case
researchers – even though they – as I, most likely never thought about it –
may take a step in the direction of science. As a firm believer in the funda-
mental divide between science and social research, you can imagine how
amusing the following outcome of my own reasoning was to me.
First, let us look at three already suggested definitions. “Analytical
generalization” has been described as “The expansion of a particular set of
results to some broader theory”32 or “An exhaustive examination of cases in
order to prove universal, casual generalizations“33 or “the combination of
observations from (a few) individual cases with theory in order to either en-
rich or partially reject the theory”34. This may give you an idea of what is at
stake. In the present context we must try to be more precise! But let us be-
gin with an example:
                                            
31 David Riesman: The Lonely Crowd, (1950), Yale Un Press, 1961.
32 Robert K Yin: Case Study Research (1984), Sage, California, 1989, Page 21 & 44.
33 Manning actually used the term analytical induction, 1982
34 Erik Maaløe: Case Studier (1996), Akademisk Forlag, Copenhagen 2002.20
Example: As I returned to Reuther Mold, now an ESOP company of one
year’s standing, one of the informants, Pam, mentioned that she separated
her co-employee-owners into three categories: those who were active, those
who waited to see what might happen, and those who more or less “threw
grit into the machinery”. This kindled some vaguely conceived ideas of
mine. However, it is vital for me to stress that it was her contribution that
made me eager to pursue this line of thought. I combined my own sense of
what I saw – Pam’s comment – my theoretical awareness of Riesman’s
concepts (as mentioned above) – Festinger’s work 35 which touches on
complacency (which by the way builds on an event recorded by Bill
Whyte36 in his case study of street-corner societies) – the common notion of
the political activist worker, known from Marxist literature – and a long-
time, emotional annoyance with organizational literature which makes a
sharp distinction between worker and manager Managers being subject to a
lot of subtle distinctions based on management styles, while workers are
kept lumped together in one overall category.
This led me – still in the field – to classify employee owners as: Techni-
cal Activists, Complaisant and Tedious. This ACT classification covers
operators and managers alike. Recently established employee-owned com-
panies often had an over-representation of managers in the “tedious” group,
who directly or indirectly try to fend off the activist operators37 politically.
Whether the ACT classification will stick is another story, which only
more extensive cross-comparative fieldwork will eventually both confirm
and enrich. It is probably valid not just for employee-owned companies,
but surely a product of the better general education of the workforce of to
day, a liberal culture thriving on entrepreneurship, constant industrial re-
constructions and a drive for democracy, etc.39
Analytical generalization is thus a synthesis created by a combination of
discrete findings/facts with theories, which we trust to be solid enough to
rely on.
                                            
35 Leon Festinger: A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford Un Press, 1957.
36 William F. Whyte: Street Corner Society, the Social Structure of Italian Slum (1943),
University of Chicago Press, 1955.
37 For their concerns and strategies, please refer to The Employee Owner, Akademisk
Forlag, 1998, Copenhagen, now available from hvb@asb.dk
39 For further specification please refer to The Employee Owner, op cit21
Analytical generalization can be attached to the outcome of surveys as
well as experiments, but is so far primarily an integrated part of the analy-
sis of case studies.
More precisely, we may define analytic generalization as a tentative con-
joining of
•  fresh observations, in order to create new and more comprehensive
theoretical wholes (induction) with
•  previously identified connections – expressed as theories – which are
believed to be relevant to the present case (deduction) with
•  the awareness that the derived results may very well show that
o  previously expressed theories may have lost validity due to a change
in opus operandi, or that they in fact never were valid, and/or that
o  previously identified connections may have to be differentiated into
sub-categories in order to be useful,
o  the way we try to formulate and integrate our observations with the
chosen set of theories may be inadequate, either due to lack of con-
cern for opus operandi, insufficient background data or carelessly
operationalized concepts.
Thus, analytical generalization may very well result in
-  a differentiation of the categories into more distinctive units or
- added supplementary categories as a hunt for a better theoretical foun-
dation, now that we have a better sense of the given, which we feel a
need to conceptualize. Please refer to Figure GG.22
Figure GG:  ANALYTIC GENERALIZATION,
A CHARACTERISTIC OF
Analytical generalization is based on a combination of unique data with a
supposed set of relationships selected among theories at hand. At the
outset it must be a tentative formulation that has to stand the trial through
more extended research that might lead to either confirmation of the
stated relationships or a deviance.
In case of deviance at least three avenues are open
•  Reformulation of the theoretical frame by e.g. differentiation: try to
integrate findings by splitting key concepts into more discernible
units.
•  Investigation of whether opus operandi for the subject chosen has
changed since the initial formulation.
•  Discard the theories chosen and start afresh looking for new ones.
Analytical generalization is the high road to more accurate sets of
theories. By implication, analytical generalization would be characterized
by emergence of increasingly more complete sets of theories and greater
sensitivity regarding when to apply them and why.23
by emergence of increasingly more complete sets of theories and greater
sensitivity regarding when to apply them and why.
Do, on the other hand, data and frame fit, then your choice strategy may
on the face of it give you credit, even though you learned nothing new
from the effort.
Please note that this characterization is an expansion of most
presentations of analytical generalizations or analytical intuition, as it is
also called.40
Thus analytical generalization “playfully” builds on the following assump-
tion: Any thesis tentatively formulated as a law and derived from statistical,
experimental or actual empirical work – should apply to any case in order
to be claimed valid – given opus operandi being fulfilled. Yet analytical
generalization also assumes that in practice it may not. And if – hopefully –
it does not, we have become that wiser and set on track to explore whether
e.g. opus operandi has changed since it was first formulated, be it due to
better education of the workforce, introduction of new production technol-
ogy, etc or the need to what?
Thus once more we are reminded that we alone are responsible for the
integration and differentiation of our case. This leaves the door open for
others to question our reliability, a challenge most case researchers do or at
least should struggle with:
Be careful not to miss the most important point
Among scores of facts conceived as data some may be damned disturbing
as they do not fit into an otherwise neat pattern. Such mis-fits may be dis-
carded as “errors of measurement”, “accidental circumstance”, “respon-
dent’s being silly enough to misunderstand the wording of an item in a
questionnaire”, etc. So, what the heck, let’s leave them out! The rest of the
data look fine! Yet, if you do not take a closer look, you will never learn,
and even worse, you may even undermine your own case. Let us look at an
example:
                                            
40 For comparison see Alan Blyman: Social Research Methods, Oxford University
Press, 2001, page 389.24
Figure SAM: DO NOT CUT YOURSELF OFF FROM THE MOST
IMPORTANT POINT
A
To decide which data to include and
which to discard is a major challenge
to all types of social research. It is
easy to state that all relevant material
should be included. But it is still up to
the researcher to decide what is rele-
vant, and thus the most important
point may be missing.
This was well illustrated in P.
Samouel’s study of “Relationship
Management” 41. The graph shows a
measure for the delivering brewery’s
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At a glance we can see that “Building
trust takes time”.
Yet Samouel threw one point away.
To include it would weaken the re-
gression model. Or worse, compli-
cated it beyond imagination, as he
would have to outline the circum-
stances as to when and why trust may
be broken.
                                            
41 Phil Samouel: The Effect of Time on Relational Norms in Dyadic Exchange Relationships,
Kingston Business School, 2002, UK25
Surely, the inclusion of the point in question would only have altered the
slope of a straight regression line slightly. Yet, it would have had a dra-
matic effect, had the best fitting parable been chosen42. Omitting the point
(figure B) would have strengthened the conclusion, omitting it would
(figure C) have led to a totally different conclusion.
But even worse, excluding that very point Samouel missed one of the
stated lessons e.g. in “The Employee Owner”: Yes, “building trust takes
time. Yet it must be maintained day after day, if not, it can be broken in a
moment”. In this case it happened when the brewery and its oldest cus-
tomer failed to agree on a new lease.43
 This may sound very critical, yet personally I prefer to commend Phil
Samouel for his honesty. Contrary to many case researchers, he informed
us what he left out.
“Trust takes time” – as shown in Figure SAM – under certain conditions. If
circumstances change, trust may vanish at the blink of an eye. Without
having a feel for the worker and/or customer relations of the past, a new in-
sensitive manager may through acts of rash incompetence, unintentionally
of course, strain the organization. Trust, once broken, takes years to re-
establish.
The inclusion dogma
The case and example presented in Figure SAM may serve us well to re-
mind us of at least two issues:
•  Not all facts, although classified as being descriptions of a similar situa-
tion, may be contingent under the same opus operandi
•  Leaving data out just because they look “odd” or inconvenient is a sure
way to cut oneself off from greater insight.
The inclusion dogma: Do not ever ignore disconcerting data, but find ways
to integrate them, for instance by grace of analytical generalization!
                                            
42 In case B 1.36% of the variation could be explained by a straight line (not shown), in
the parable 1.62%, and in case C is respectively 3.1 and 392%. Thus the parable would
be a better fit than a straight line no matter what.
43 Personal communication with Phil Samouel26
Looking at practice, not all will agree with such a requirement, I am
sure Throwing away disturbing data does not seem to bother analysts of
statistical data, as much as I believe it ought to. Yet, what they leave out at
least stares them in the face. So they do know! Qualitative researchers are
often worse off. We may not even ourselves be aware of the potentially
disquieting facts, we just skate past without even throwing a glance at
them. Hence, the importance at the very outset of any study to take steps to
increase ones own theoretical sensitivity!
The inclusion dogma is of paramount importance for the enrichment and
enhancement of the utility of social research:
•  The range of variation around what is generally expected as well as
disturbing facts have to be valued as the high road to practice-related
theoretical progress.
This has important implications for analytical generalization and the design
of cases studies in general and theoretical sampling in particular: We must
try to choose the fields for our case studies, not randomly, but with a con-
scious eye for how they may potentially enrich our grasp of the real and
thus more comprehensive theoretical insight.
Apparently analytical generalizations differ profoundly from statistical
generalizations, as they claim to be valid not just in general but concretely
in any case they purport to cover. If not, the case opus operandi may have
to be examined in greater detail. We will return to this line of thought in the
chapter devoted to explanation.
For the present we have to direct our attention to the other major issue
of critical importance for case studies: the degree of researcher awareness
and thus the reliability of the ensuing case studies.
                                            
46 Allow me to draw attention to the fact that in The  Employee  Owner, all the
informants quoted, apart from one, are mentioned by name. At times anonymity is
necessary, but it weakens the validity of research and opens for all sorts of writer tricks,
e.g. by making the number of employees interviewed appear to be higher than the few
actually addressed.27
THE CONCERN FOR RELIABILITY
While statisticians may mention the data they skip, readers of qualitative
studies are at loss. The collection of facts generated during my study of
employee-owned companies is several running meters long. This is both a
blessing of richness and a threat to inclusiveness. First, several meters of
densely packed text are far more than most people will care to control.
With such an amount, it is all too easy for anyone both to cheat and forego
data that will disturb any line of argument of “your” preference. And
worse, I may even say I have to shield “my” data from scrutiny in order to
“protect” and wrap my informants in a cloak of anonymity.46
But worst of all, I may myself overlook the small gold nuggets in the
rubble of the more mundane data. Just to make a call for honesty is not
enough. It is so easy to overlook or surpass potentially disturbing facts as
irrelevant.  It  would  be  far  better  to  turn  the  call  for  honesty  into  a
methodological principle.47
Roles of researchers
– the power of sight as a metaphor in epistemology
One of the major arenas of discord among social researchers is that of the
proper research role. Different schools take different stands: they may
claim “we” ought to be a) distant, disinterested observers as natural scien-
tists are supposed to be, b) close to and involved in subjects under study or
even c) obliged to try to help them on their own terms to personally im-
prove their situation.
Traditionally epistemology leans on “what hits the eyes” as the paradigm
for generation of data. Sound, smell, taste and touch have never explicitly
been taken into account as nearly a trustworthy foundation for science as
sight.
If you try to defend this position, you will soon run into difficulties. But
true, it appears to be easier to distance oneself from what we see than what
we sense for instance by touch. Secondly, it is easier to talk about what is
in front of us than about what we hear. Sounds in the wind rarely have the
                                            
47 How this call may be honoured is only implicitly stated in the present book. I hope
one day to demonstrate what it may entail in an explicit presentation of “dialectical
realism”, expressed as a constant drive toward integrative absorption of new and
distressing data into an already established theoretical whole.28
same permanence as the temporary, solid image of the sea.. What we look
at seems to remain there to be sensed, even if it changes, be it the tree in
our childhood garden or the potatoes we are going cook. In contrast, we
rapidly loose track of the smell of a dog just passing by.
“Looking” seems to be associated more easily with permanence, dis-
tance and non-involvement, and as such served man well as a metaphorical
paradigm for a scientific ideal of being untouched by the subject. Thus, any
social research which is fuelled by an ideal of being close to and involved
in other people, may very easily come to be regarded with suspicion if not
scorn.
This ethos is enhanced by the artificial separation between mind and
body. Metaphorically we see with the mind’s eye, while emotions occur in
the body, hidden from direct sight and the scrutiny of others
It is as if “what we see” and thus acknowledge as data is beyond discus-
sion. “Facts are indisputable” as some say. Taste is not!
If so, what we might debate is not “what is” but the meaning of what we
notice, for instance why and how something happened. The more dominant
the social dimension and thus the role of language as a medium for trans-
ferring statements, the less reliable we may rank information. However
sound this line of argument may be, it is nevertheless important to ac-
knowledge that it plainly ignores the fact that even what we sense is partly
determined by language. Yet we are not – as I later will argue – entirely
bound by it. Words just act as pointers for what we can see or at least talk
to others about in plain language.
The writers who struggle every day to find the right words to express
their inner sense, they know. What they sense and are called to express
may be a bodily feeling, a hunch and the words just an approximating me-
dium they hope may create some resonance in the Other.
You may close your eyes, and although there is nothing to be seen,
touch e will ensure you that the world still is. And not only can you feel it,
your body is it!
                                            
49 The figure is an extension of the one presented on page 93 in Martin Hammersley &
Paul Atkinson: Ethnography, Tavistok Publications, 1983.29
But surely, being close in the people you allow yourself to study, takes its
toll. The closer you get, the more obvious the range of conditioning factors.
From the outside, say in a economist perspective, any foreman is just a
foreman, if noticed at all. Seen from within the company, each individual
foreman achieves a significance of his own. To the case researcher each
foremen encountered becomes a person as are the members of their crews
So the range of opus operandi accordingly increases.
Equally, the further away you get from the concrete reality, the easier it
becomes to ignore the multitude of opus operandi. You can even cut your-
self off from recognizing how realities are created as people shape them. If
so, the subjects in question are hardly given a chance to remedy what they
might perceive as insensitive or superficial in your account of them.
Yet the truth is hidden in the detail, not in sweeping statements that ig-
nore the multi-dimensional richness of lived life.
On the other hand, no one should ignore the fruitfulness of a general idea
of the overall picture, e.g. the performance of employee-owned companies
within different industries, national cultures, etc. It is only when you want
to take the step from the overall descriptive picture down to why it is as it
appears to be, that case investigations are as necessary as they may be en-
lightening.
For an overview of advantages and drawbacks, please refer to Figure
SR.30
Figure SR: SOCIAL ROLES OF FIELD/CASE WORKERS 49
The continuum of research ranges from an ideal of complete absence from
the scene to the practice of working within and studying one’s own organi-
zation.
At one end, the wholly detached student may never set foot in the world
he studies, e.g. by working with second-hand statistical data, or if he does
make his own observations, he may try to do his work unobserved by the
people studied. At the other end, we have the action researcher working
with a group helping them to come to terms with their own lives.
Case research will – as it is generally understood – be somewhere in
between the extremes.31
The challenge of personal as well as professional biases!
Every researcher has to face the question: How trustworthy is my synthesis.
Yet, survey researchers need not live with it as an existential challenge.
Case researchers have to. As we live within the realm of the field we ex-
plore, we are so much more likely to feel the need to be aware of our own
behavioral patterns. The presence of the “other” as informants simply
challenges us day by day to face our vulnerability to bias. This pressure
towards self-awareness is both a burden and one of the most personally
challenging and enlightening aspects of embarking on case research:
"I" am the measuring instrument, the interpreter and processor of data. It
is me as an "I" who observes what is going on, "I" who talks with people
about what they do and how they do it, "I" who step by step process the
notes "I" collected to reach a synthesis. And as we have our sympathies and
even special interests, we may subconsciously be led to emphasize certain
aspects and ignore others, or worse even, project our own private drama
into the field. Yet, if I attempt to convey images of the perceived world of
others I cannot just present their feelings and ways of looking at the world
in my own preferred vocabulary. I have to respect them opening myself to
containing their world. Thus, the informants must be instructed to look at
my results in order to correct me where I have left out something important
to them. Only sharing can help us envision how “we”, they as well as I,
perceive their situation, what conclusions other observers would reach thus
helping us identify what our preferences may be.
This may be burdensome. Yet the challenge must be seen as a gift, as
we shall see. First, though, we have to admit to our vulnerability as the next
example suggests:
In her 1928-book on life in Samoa,50 Margaret Mead laments how dif-
ficult it is to grow from child to woman in the U.S. Especially compared to
the children in the Pacific who as it appeared grew up in an atmosphere,
which Mead's readers took to be a lack of parental pressure, play and a re-
laxed attitude to sex. Liberal Americans in general and educators in par-
ticular loved this description. As her tutor Frank Boas preached, it proved
                                            
50 Margaret Mead: The Coming of Age in Samoa − a study of adolescence and sex in
primitive societies, (1928) Penguin 1973.32
that "social stimulus is infinitely more potent than the biological mecha-
nism."51
50 years later her description was challenged by another anthropologist,
Derek Freeman, who claimed that her description was a distortion.52 Life in
Samoa was torn with competition, and for instance, as elsewhere, brides
had to prove their virginity at the wedding. Nor did Mead's text make any
allusions to rape, incest and children being beaten in Samoa. It was as if her
informants had been inclined to convince her that they had all become good
Christians. Ironically, her liberal readers, too, had a yearning for being se-
duced into believing in a possible paradise on earth, after the proper social
education had got the better of the old Adam. Accordingly, Roger Sandall
places Mead within a contemporary trend of romanticizing primitivism,
which may have been so much easier for young Margaret as she slept at the
US Naval Dispensary rather than in the uninviting huts of the Samoans.53
The lesson to be learned, as Freeman points out, is what Mead did not
do. Her actual fieldwork did not last for more than four or five weeks. She
interviewed several of the young, local girls but did not present her find-
ings to the Samoans at large nor did she ask them for their comments. This
would be like conveying a report on management-labor relations based
solely on interviews with senior management! The point here is not only
getting an idea of a whole, but to have one's own potential biases checked.
To achieve this, there is no better way than opening oneself to criticism −
especially from the very people whose behavior and sentiments one claims
to have studied. As this could very well become an idiom for research, let
us consider what it may entail:
Self-awareness
Self-awareness means looking at your self as you were an “other” to your-
self. Philosophically, you may argue that one cannot take an “observant as
if disinterested” view at oneself54. This may very well be the case. Yet it is
                                            
51 Frank Boas: The Methods of Ethnology (1920), in Frank Boas: Race, Language and
Culture, New York, 1940, page 281.
52 Derek Freeman: Margaret Mead and Samoa – the making and un-making of an
anthropological myth, Harvard University Press, 1983.
53 Roger Sandall: The Culture Cult – designer tribalism and other essays, Chapter 4:
The Triumph of the Litterateur. Westview Press, 2000.
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something many people know can be quite useful at least to try. But it is
indeed a tricky affair.
On the one hand we probably know more about ourselves, especially
our  inner  e-motions,  than  anybody  else.  On  the  other,  we  are  not
transparent and in this sense strangers to ourselves. Just as we do not
understand what is going on in the world around us, we do not have a firm
understanding of all of what is going on within our own bodies either. Psy-
choanalysis may even inform us that we do not even want to acknowledge
all of it. Thus we may exclude ourselves from getting to our main scars and
inner drives.
As individuals we are not on top of the world but enmeshed in it, body
and soul. The terra incognita of reality is around us as well as buried within
ourselves. The challenge of getting in touch with the inner is simply that is
so near to us.
Self-awareness means that you start to look at the ways you behave:
how you react, how others react towards you, when and how you respond,
the fantasies and kinds of wishful thinking you indulge in as well as the
plans you make. This is a process that might be depicted as a single loop
feedback system – based on acts we observe, name and integrate into
wholes as we know best. After taking notice, we might next compare what
we did with alternative images of what we could have done as well as al-
ternative actions we may encourage ourselves to enact in the future, as il-
lustrated in Figure AFB. Of course, we may not succeed as planned. If so,
we have to reflect on what went wrong and try again.
Thus introspection should serve to make us more free in the sense of not
only making us sensitive to the blockages in our own lives, but set us on a
explorative trail to forego them. This may in turn alert us to sense and
contain how the other person in front of us mistreats herself.34
Figure AFB:  AWARENESS AND THE ATTEMPT TO CONTROL AND
LEARN, DEPICTED AS IF IT WERE A SIMPLE ONE-
LOOP FEEDBACK SYSTEM
Any attempt to edu-
cate and train oneself





tions of what is
happening around,
to and within one-
self
2: reflection on
whether – given the
circumstances – the
situation serves one well, or whether one can imagine oneself being able
to do something about it. This may very well trigger:
3: a decision to act and/or an attempt to forestall and alter e.g. one’s reac-
tion patterns.
It is worth noting that the very wish or even decision and preparation to
act in a certain way does not in itself entail action. We cannot just do as
we please. Also we may not have identified the situation as well as the
alternatives correctly. Or we may at the moment of truth back up in fear
of the consequences, if we do act as planned.
Please note that the “control loop” is usually depicted as a separate entity.
Yet, our neurological system is as much a part of the body as the muscu-
lar system and organs, the nesting places for feelings and our emotional
scars
When transferred into a social domain in general and of case research in
particular, the feedback model may take the shape of the model depicted in
Figure AS:
Unchallenged, as if we were growing up in a traditional culture, we take
what we can see at face value (stage 1) – a position which epistemological35
arrogance terms naïve realism. Western children soon learn that adults do
not act alike, and the individual has to be treated differently – as far as pos-
sible. To find our way in this mess we resort to all kinds of rules including
proverbs and other ad hoc explanations, which will be explored in some
detail in a later chapter.
Figure AS: THE AWARENESS SPIRAL
Generally we believe that what we see is what it is. An epistemological po-
sition called naïve realism, a situation we all are swallowed up in, absorbed
as we are in our daily routines. In the extreme, “I” as we each call ourselves
as an individual – I am just seen as a smith, postman or teacher. – In short
as an “it”, that does so and so – a functional identity. 57
Generally we are all naïve realists, unless something stirs us up and
arouses our awareness. Yet the more “I” respond to people who invite me
to listen, the more “I” may learn that – despite our shared language – we do
in fact not always “see” nor detect the same aspects of reality, nor do we
attach the same importance or meaning to the seen. Thus, awareness is
fuelled by social intercourse.36
Later, we may compare and in consequence wonder about ourselves as
perceiving entities, and occasionally we realize that we do not just see, we
interpret as we see. Thus, naïve realism has lost its innocence.
Of course, we already know that we have the same interest as others.
But beyond that it may dawn on us that how we perceive depends on our
personality: the more or less wounded, separated and as such overempha-
sized parts of ourselves that tempt us to give way, for instance, to pride. If
so we are moving towards understanding not only ourselves as well as
others, but perhaps even the plasticity of human beings
As we listen to the reasoning of others (stage 2) we soon discover that
people have had different experiences and do not share the same outlook.
This sets the stage for the open, inquisitive mind to identify one’s own
worldviews and compare them with those of others (stage 3). Yet some act
defensively and are thus drawn into self-protective, self-righteous fights
against others as a shield against any further self-exploration.
Yet hopefully we move on and learn to see ourselves as interpreting
entities (stage 4). Especially during fieldwork we may even make the ex-
periment of looking at ourselves as well as the world around us with the
different perspectives that the informants offer us. This is a most rewarding
aspect of fieldwork and an important tool for sensitizing oneself to how and
why other people look at the world as they do, and in consequence question
your own (stages 5 and 6). At later stages, the process may even lead to a
greater awareness of the unawareness of a person in front of us. 60
Thus, expansion and learning to see oneself as an interpreting entity is
not just a private matter. It is primarily a social affair, based on encounters
with people with views different from one’s own. Yet it is also a private
challenge in the sense that you have to coach yourself to be able to contain
the views of others. If not, nothing but rejection or, even worse, hostility
towards and fights against the other will result.
Fortunately, when the process has been set in motion, it is most likely to
continue. Rather than identifying yourself with what you do and how you
usually react, you will see yourself as a transient person, constantly out-
growing what you were, with all the pain and delight it entails.
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60 A subject we return to regarding understanding/empathy as a practice. 61 This,
though, is not necessarily relevant for neither T-test nor Grounded Method.37
Learning to contain the “other” during fieldwork
To learn to contain others is a rewarding challenge for us all in everyday
life. Thus, the beauty of fieldwork in the explorative-integrative tradition is
that it forces us to try. 61
Students about to embark on fieldwork have often asked me: “Who
should I identify with”? Apparently they imagine research partly to be a
political adventure, assuming having to choose sides, as most books on
management implicitly do. And, of course, it is something you have t o
consider! If you are conducting a theory test, the answer is determined with
the stated conjectures. For case research in general though and explorative
research in particular, my advice is not to take sides.
Yet, we do have to have a fix point! What I recommend – a recommen-
dation I try to follow myself – is that we should acknowledge our igno-
rance and identify with our curiosity. Fieldwork is not a stage set for to us
to judge other people in accordance with our private opinions or political
preferences. We want to explore what happens to, goes on with and be-
tween our informants.
Secondly: pay heed to your own reactions! Do not try to be cynical and
emotionless during fieldwork. Be attentive and acknowledge your feelings,
stick to your curiosity, if so you may even get in contact with those of the
other.
There is a lot to learn by being alert. Say, there is a person or a group of
persons you do not like to approach, even less to interview for personal
reasons or due to the picture the other informants have led you to form.
Then it is, of course, essential that you get as close to them as possible in
order to be able to expand the picture. Identifying with your curiosity is a
far better anchor point than fear of being challenged.
Likewise listen to and recognize your emotions, however disagreeable.
Embarrassment for instance tells us first that we have been able to get
under the skin of the other, and secondly that we sense we overstepped a
line and behaved out of touch with the prevailing culture. To be caught by
embarrassment – however unpleasant – must thus be seen as a gift to re-
mind us to get a better grasp of the environment we are moving within and
to learn to act accordingly.
Thirdly, an explorative case researcher sets out to act more out of
curiosity than for political reasons, thus you have to be painfully aware
when and how your informants may want to use you for their own pur-38
poses, e.g. using us a messenger boys to convey a commendable picture of
themselves to upper management. My advice is not to dismiss the opportu-
nity. Allow yourself to be taken in, let yourself be seduced, while you in-
wardly acknowledge what is going on.
Example 1: During the last phase of my fieldwork I tried – still in the field
– to challenge the synthesis of my account as it seemed to emerge. In this
process I had great help from a storage worker at Fastener Inc. Originally
trained as a biologist, Hank had a “predator-Darwinist” outlook on life62 He
wanted to correct my preliminary text on the company which he – as all
other employee-owners – had received. Management at Fastener was – as
anywhere else – primarily interested in maintaining their own power, he
said. OK, I responded to the challenge as a participant-observer.
The following two days I took every opportunity to look for clues that
could confirm his views. An intense experience by the way! Did managers
talk down to others, did they fend off critical questions63, were they defen-
sive, etc?
No, they were indeed ready to listen, explain and make themselves vul-
nerable to critique. And, certainly, letting myself, consciously be seduced
to look at the world at Hank’s point of view, did in fact help me ground my
conclusions all the firmer. He helped me check them a second time.
Experimenting with different angles of interpretation – especially those
you do not share – during fieldwork is a great help and perhaps the best
means to test and increase your sensitivity.
Example 2: Once I stumbled on a chance to interview a young – let us call
him teamster – who had just “inherited his union” from his deceased father.
He had two great visions: Every time he was able to get a 10%-wage in-
crease for his members, he should get 5% to cover his personal expenses.
Secondly, he wondered whether it would be a good idea to transform some
of his members’ major places of work into employee-owned companies,
                                            
62 ”Predator-Darwinism” is the ideology associated with vulgar-liberalism that claims
the right of the stronger to exploit the weaker. A position that ignores the emphasis that
Darwin put on social strategies for survival.
63 The incident relates entirely to the Fastener case. “The Employee Owner” more than
amply illustrates an array of defensive tactics that managers use to belittle workers at
other ESOP’s.39
which he then saw himself as governing from the top. I thought this pro-
foundly criminal. Yet to him it was as natural as the air he had breathed at
home. I tried to follow suit and ride along. I knew quite well that – if I be-
gan to voice my own opinionated views – I would forsake a great learning
opportunity. And as you may infer from above, neither would I ever betray
him and have never published anything about our encounter except for
what I have written here.
The game simply is this: If you want to grasp what other people feel and
how they reason, you should go along, promote contact with their inner life
and give them time and space to search for words to express themselves.
You do not debate with them. Instead you make yourself available to them
as a sounding board for an exploration of their inner drives. But you have
to be on guard and not let yourself be sucked into their, say, agonies. Just
be aware of what is going on within yourself, too. Only do not act it out! It
is not your life that is at the center, but theirs. Furthermore – and this is an
ethical dogma – do not betray your informants at a later stage! Feelings
matter, and so does the will to be trustworthy.
The reward is great: if done properly, you will catch glimpses of the
plasticity of the human conditions: how and under what circumstances
feelings, ideas and behavior take form. Thus, you are enriched too. Listen-
ing works!
Containing the other is possible only providing that you want to and pre-
pare yourself to do so. Maybe we do have a far better chance of learning to
do it during fieldwork than within our own organization, especially if the
climate is too politicized. Nevertheless it is possible here too, as proven for
instance in the mentor system.
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EXPLANATION, INTERPRETATION,
UNDERSTANDING, CUNNING AND THE RHETORIC
The potential challenge to and fascination of case research is to get a grasp
of the world, including our own. Thus case studies may aim at:
•  Interpretation – to make sense out of observed behaviors and speech
acts, including why, say, a manager or husband does not “act his
words,” – or an economist trying to make sense of a certain cluster of
data or a humanist out of a set of poems or paintings.
•  Explanation – at a minimum
o  to present sets of laws from which we can predict what will occur
next, given the present situation, without necessarily telling us
how and why this may be so – the black-box approach.
Or even better to present
o  a precise “clockwork-like” account of how the interchanges by
inner moving parts eventually must result in a range of outward
observable states occurring on “the face”
or
•  understanding the interchange of interpretations between people of
different views and experiences that eventually should result in a better
feel for human plasticity, as within the human psychologies.
As we have already seen,65 man has a drive or even an obsession to make
sense out of the world within or around him. Like journalists, “we” simply
have to show ourselves competent enough to generate reasons to explain
why people behave like they do – as if man is driven by inner motivations,
like some mechanical clocks by a tightened spring. Yet, what may appear
as an explanation to one person, may just account for a point of view to
another, an interpretation.
Now people with different interpretations may seek shelter with people
who share their views in order to present a united front to others. Or we
may sit down with each our own insights with a mutual readiness to search
for the experiences and emotional reactions that we – as “we” help each
other to look backwards and inwards – begin to realize could have shaped
our present attitudes. If so, an understanding may occur.
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These three different approaches permeate social research. The question
of how will be the challenge and the subject of the next three major
chapters! Yet we have to stress that as concepts “explanation, interpretation
and understanding” are most often used without much precision and even
often interchangeably. Thus the following short initial overview may be
useful.
Explanation
Ordinary language is full of expressions in the format of laws we use to
make sense of human behavior. A phrase like “everybody thinks of himself
first and foremost” is not really a law, but a slogan to be used according to
circumstance. Thus we can usually find another that expresses the opposite
insight, like “man is primarily a social being”.
Everyday wisdom apart, a great part of middle and grand-level social re-
search has been geared towards identifying laws for human behavior. As if
“we” like machines act according to circumstance. And there may be laws,
general as well as specific, according to sociological groups. To accept it,
however, is fraught with difficulties:
o  If for instance you identify a rule I seem to follow, I can readily refute it
and show how wrong you are by doing the opposite – smile or even
laugh, for instance, instead of getting angry as you expected when op-
posing me.
o  But worse, the very idea of laws for human behavior implicitly pre-
sumes us to have sets of reactive patterns like a worm, which – we
suppose – just acts according to instinct in order to survive long enough
to reproduce. Or, in our case, to stick to custom or – if you prefer –
optimize our self-interests, as economists might express it.
o  Social researchers believing in the explanatory idiom will most likely
have an elitist attitude. On the one hand, they readily – as distant, disin-
terested observers – assume themselves able to identify the law-driven
behavior of others. On the other, they perceive or even believe their own
behavior to be based on fair judgment. Accordingly they may use statis-
tical analysis to predict the reactions of others, for instance to enhance
the effectiveness of advertising on working class people, even though
they do not necessarily see themselves – as researchers – to be subject
to such laws. Thus they as “scientists” believe that they can act as if
they were outside society, as e.g. men from Mars.42
o  Nevertheless acts have consequences and decisions are made with this
in mind. People do adapt to tax-rules, we do let ourselves be moved by
movies. Behaviorism has taught us how well persuasion by reward
works as compared to punishment. Not only do we act as though we are
governed by rules, we resort to them in order to get a better grip on the
lives not just of others, but our own as well.
The idea of explanations in social research is borrowed from the natural
sciences as are the absolute discerning characteristic of the positivist idiom
of social explanations: Explanations are universal. What they claim to be
true must be true – not necessarily regardless of culture – but, of course,
always within the opus operandi specified for applying the explanations.
And even though explanatory schemes for social behavior may not have
the same “iron-firmness” as those for nature, they are often reliable enough
for us to use as guides for goal-oriented decision-making.
From explanation to interpretation
– a challenge to human consciousness
The  often-stated  discerning  difference  between  explanation  and
interpretation  is  that  the  former  is  derived  from  reasoning  based  on
identified rules, whereas the latter is based on hunch, insight and whatnot.
This is partially true in the sense that explanations rely on explicitly stated
rules. Yet, the difference between explanation and interpretation is not that
the former relies on rules and the latter does not. It is rather a difference in
position:
•  Explanation aims at giving us descriptions of what may happen and in-
forming us why by referring to universal principles based on sets of
well-specified logical analysis of outcomes of empirical investigations.
The very strength of explanations is the claim that they are constructed
in ways that are partly beyond the control of the researcher and easy for
others to check. They should persuade by data and logic alone!
•  Interpretations are often structured like explanations, but they do not
claim to refer to generalized principles, but to principles “I” favor and
thus am responsible for using. Principles “I” even may be able to back
with data, which – I may be painfully aware – are derived from a chosen
set available on the market. Thus we – as interpreters – have to persuade
by words and emotional appeal (rhetoric) as well as favorably selected
illuminating cases.43
•  Understanding is - unlike interpretation – more than just an effort to
make sense of how others perceive their world. Understanding implies –
in the sense we intend to use the word – an appeal to others to check
whether we are able to “get under their skin” beyond just paraphrasing
their words and gestures. Thus understanding is based on dialogue and
self-awareness.
Consequently explanations stress that what we claim to be the case has to
have an empirical foundation; interpretations stress that we are responsible
for what we claim to see and take to be the given world, whereas under-
standing aims at i) opening our senses to the fact that the world – as it
appears to us – may be different from that of others and ii) sharing an
mutually exploring the genesis as well as the consequences of these views,
a process that iii) most likely may change them.
To perceive the social as if it were like the natural is an interpretation in it-
self. So, if we accept that we will never be able to neither mimic nor
completely acquire the necessary competence to see and sense as the
others, even those closest to us, then we have to claim that all social re-
search has to be interpretative. Probably true!
Yet I think we had better keep the three approaches apart, as the
explanatory and the understanding modes both can be seen as ideal types to
remedy some often-voiced weaknesses of interpretation as a research
vehicle.
Explanations and understandings as
ideal forms of thinking, aiming at harnessing the voices of interpretation
Interpretation hinges on what we subjectively are able to contain. So if you
cannot  see  gnomes,  they  cannot  be  –  and  you  may  feel  tempted  to
characterize those of us who can, as e.g. a superstitious lot. Or, like
communists see the rest of us, as subject to false consciousness.
What we could learn to contain, though, may become a resource for
coming to terms with the behavior of others – however strange their e.g.
religious habits may appear at a first glance. Thus sticking to our own
subjectivity, even though it may help us make the world our own, may not
help us to come to terms with other people, neither how they really are nor
how they perceive themselves.
To overcome this insensitivity and all the sorrow it may contain, two
avenues – as shown in Figure TWIDIN – have been suggested; one cold,
the other warm. The first one, the cold reaction, calls for explanations:44
Figure TWIDIN: EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING AS IDEAL
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reliance and inductive-deductive reasoning grounded on observation rather
than on beliefs. Neutrality accomplished by distance and non-engagement!
Accordingly, one’s own inadequate beliefs are expected to be enriched by
data on how “it really is”.
The other one, the warm reaction, is a call for a mutual quest in the
form of a dialogue to explore how each of our beliefs, perceptions of the
world around and within us may have been formed and what this means for
as well as to us. Reflection accomplished by being near and listening!
Overview
The three forms actually do presuppose each other, as we shall later see;
yet so far it may serve us all to acknowledge how every approach has its
own inherent beauty:
•  Explanation, because it induces us to be as explicit as possible about
the rules we believe to have detected.
•  Interpretation, because it serves to remind us of our responsibility for
what we select and how we present it as our case.
•  Understanding, because it tempts us to move towards going beyond
ourselves and getting a feel for how others might interpret their
worlds.
Or, in terms of our relations to the other
o  Explanation:  You  are  as  an  ‘it’  exposed  to  a  proven  set  of
measuring instruments which I and other colleagues apply as the
best fit to reality.
o  Interpretation: You are as an ‘other’ exposed and involved on my
terms.
o  Understanding: Involving myself in the other on his/her terms.
(You are indeed an interesting person, so let us see whether we
can learn something about life from each other.)
Social researchers, though, do not necessarily agree with the position
presented here.
Rather  than  exploring  the  power  of  approaches  alien  to  them,  some
researchers invest a lot of energies in defending their own approach by
attacking others, as illustrated in the final figure, AOR.  But let us first give
a  short  overview  of  traits  from  the  three  classical  epistemological46
approaches to social and humanistic research in general, Figure OV, and
more specifically Figure OV.1
Figure OV: THREE CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL
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who in turn is seen
as an instructor66
for oneself as well.
                                            
66 Remember reference, Egenskab og Fællesskab.48
The two tables above should be read with certain reservations. It may be
important to stress that working in the understanding mode presupposes
that you can both be
•  near and attentive to the other
while at the same time
•  keeping a distance to your own immediate reactions, while you play
with different interpretations of the substance of your encounter.
Rhetoric of the confusing realities
Concepts may have wide spans of significance.67 And in particular the
distinctions between explanation, interpretation and understanding are
confusingly intermingled in everyday conversation.
First: Understanding is often used as a synonym to express the ability of
an expert to handle explanatory systems. Thus, the excellent engineer feels
he understands the laws of physics as he handles them with evident creative
success. So even though we might prefer to restrict understanding to the
field of getting to terms with the human condition, we have to accept the
right of scientists to state that they understand nature and see it as an
expression of an analogy to understanding the human condition.
Secondly: As analysts working in the interpreting mode we may often
feel and thus state that we understand what is happening to or with others.
We might even feel cleverer and be more gifted than most. We may thus
not see how we partly reproduce ourselves in our presentation of, e.g., an
interviewee’s way of seeing. We just feel we understand as we give
ourselves free reins to use the other as a means to recreate a universe of our
own. We may even try to ground our convictions by hostile argumentation
against those who prefer to bring alternative word schemes into play.
In a culture that encourages us to aim for the last word, we have to
admit that “nearly everything perceived and mediated to others by word,
drawing or music may be seen as an interpretation”. Thus, Figure OV
above may be seen as an expression of how someone – who respects all the
approaches, yet personally is committed to the understanding paradigm –
would tend to look at other types of social sciences. The figure may thus be
seen as a betrayal to the outlook of the other positions, as they are not
                                            
67 Coming to Terms, op cit49
understood  on  their  own  premises.  Thus  the  following  Figure  AOR is
presented as an attempt to depict inside views of how the three different
approaches look at themselves as well as researchers in the other two
camps.
Figure AOR: HOW  SUPPORTERS  OF  THE  VARIOUS  POSITIONs
MAY  PERCEIVE  AND  PRAISE  THEMSELVES  AND
BELITTLE EACH OTHER
Those who argue the aim of social research is to
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